Steve Again at Hyler and Lopez
127 N.C. App. 266 488 S.E.2d 838
Important Paras
- "Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue decided previously in judicial or administrative proceedings provided the party against whom the prior decision was asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in an earlier proceeding." In re McNallen, 62 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1995). See also King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 358, 200 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1973).Go to
- Until recently, our courts limited the application of collateral estoppel to parties or those in privity with them by requiring "mutuality": both parties had to be bound by the earlier judgment. King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. at 357, 200 S.E.2d at 805. However, in 1986, our Supreme Court, recognizing that "[t]he modern trend in both federal and state courts is to abandon the requirement of mutuality for collateral estoppel," eliminated the mutuality requirement for defensive collateral estoppel. Thomas M. McInnis Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 432, 349 S.E.2d 552, 558 (1986) (non-mutual, defensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action against a different party. See Parklane Hosiery Company v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 58 L.Ed.2d 552, 559 (1979)).Go to
- 1. Judgments § 222 (NCI4th) — offensive collateral estoppel — mutuality — not required
North Carolina authorizes the non-mutual, offensive use of collateral estoppel. Mutuality of parties is no longer required when invoking either offensive or defensive collateral estoppel.
The trial court abused its discretion in an action arising from an automobile accident by allowing plaintiff Rymer to assert offensive collateral estoppel on the issue of last clear chance where plaintiff had been a passenger in a car driven by defendant's decedent and the jury in an prior action had found that the decedent had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, but the prior plaintiff had been the owner of the car and had been the front rather than the rear passenger in a two-door car. Plaintiff Rymer could have intervened in the prior action but did not, and defendant had no opportunity or incentive to raise these arguments. North Carolina courts are to strictly scrutinize whether to apply the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel in light of judicial economy and fairness to the other party.
Go to - This case presents two issues on appeal: (I) Does North Carolina authorize the non-mutual, offensive use of collateral estoppel; and (II) If so, did the trial court abuse its discretion in applying it in this case. We find that our state does authorize the non-mutual, offensive use of collateral estoppel but conclude that it would be inequitable to allow Ms. Rymer to assert it in this case. We, therefore, reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.Go to
- In the subject case, Ms. Rymer was not a party to the Trantham litigation, but she seeks to use the Trantham judgment against the Estate of Sorrells, which was a party in Trantham. This is known as non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel: a plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant from relitigating an issue that the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action against a different party. See Parklane, supra. In principle, this Court in Tar Landing Villas v. Town of Atlantic Beach, 64 N.C. App. 239, 307 S.E.2d 181 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 156, 311 S.E.2d 296 (1984), approved of the use of non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel even though we chose not to apply it in that case. Writing for the Court, Judge Wells stated:Go to
- Again, we reiterate Judge Wells' recognition of the modern trend and conclude that mutuality of parties is no longer required when invoking either offensive or defensive collateral estoppel.Go to
- The Supreme Court also noted that offensive use of collateral estoppel might be unfair to a defendant if, among other things: (1) the defendant had little incentive to defend vigorously in the first action; (2) the judgment relied upon as the basis for the estoppel is inconsistent with previous judgments; and (3) the second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result. Id. at 330-31, 58 L.Ed 2d at 561-62. In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court cautioned that non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel should not be applied where: (1) a plaintiff in the second action could have easily joined in the earlier suit; or (2) where the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant. Id. at 331, 58 L.Ed.2d at 562.Go to
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